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I. INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves two separate and distinct legal issues: transmutation of real 
property and valid delivery of a deed. In his opening brief, Jack argued that the District Court 
committed error on both issues by applying the incorrect legal standards and relying on evidence 
that was legally and logically irrelevant if the correct legal standards had been applied. Jack also 
argued that there was not substantial and competent evidence to support several of the facts 
found by the District Court. 
Thelma's responsive brief argued, almost exclusively, that none of the evidence 
presented at trial was controverted and, accordingly, this Court should simply defer to the 
District Court's decision. While much of the evidence presented at trial was uncontroverted, this 
appeal is not about evidentiary issues; it is about legal issues. Specifically, whether the correct 
standards of law were applied and whether the findings would actually support the District 
Court's judgment if the correct standards of law had been applied. 
Because the District Court erred on each of these points, it is immaterial whether the 
evidence presented was controverted. In the final analysis, the evidence presented and the facts 
found simply did not support the judgment entered. For the reasons that follow, Jack 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions to 
enter an order to partition the Middleton Place. 
ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The crux of this appeal concerns the intersection of the law and the facts and, 
specifically, whether the District Court committed error when applying the facts to the law. In 
his opening brief, Jack argued that the District Court committed multiple errors because it 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1 
applied the incorrect standard of law. Because the standards of law applied by the District Court 
were incorrect, the findings could not and did not support the judgment. 
Thelma's responsive brief argues that this Court should defer to the District Court's 
determination that clear and convincing evidence supported its conclusions of law. See, 
generally, Resp. Br. 10-11. This argument misses a critical step. While the District Court's 
findings are entitled to significant deference, this Court has greater leeway when considering 
whether the findings actually support correct legal standards. 
Unlike review of whether substantial and competent evidence supports findings of fact, 
this Court may exercise free review over the District Court's application of those findings to the 
correct legal standard: "[T]his court may substitute its view for that of the district court on a 
legal issue." Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997) (citing Standards 
of Appellate Review in State and Federal Courts, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK, Section 4.2 
(1996»; see also Kraly v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 303, 208 P.3d 281, 285 (2009) ("The 
characterization of [real property] in light of the facts found, however, is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review."). Accordingly, when determining whether the District 
Court properly applied its findings to the law, this Court may exercise free review. Marshall, 
130 Idaho at 679-80,946 P.2d at 979-80; see also Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 221, 657 P.2d 
1083, 1089 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the reviewing court can determine the legal nature of 
transactions, so long as doing so does not require it to weigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the 
evidence, draw inferences from the evidence, form an opinion as to the credibility of witnesses 
or make factual determinations different from the trial court). 
While a handful of findings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence, 
these findings address facts that were otherwise irrelevant as a matter of law. Because the 
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present appeal asks this Court to (i) review the legal standards applied by the District Court and 
(ii) apply the District Court's findings to the correct legal standards, all matters presented for 
review are questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
III. ARGUMENT 
First, the District Court applied the incorrect legal standards in reaching the conclusion 
that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed transmuted Alva's separate property interest in the Middleton 
Place into community property. And, because the court applied the incorrect legal standard it 
relied on factual findings that were legally and logically irrelevant and do not support the 
judgment. Applying the correct legal standard, the District Court's findings do not support a 
conclusion that Alva transmuted his separate property interest in the Middleton Place into 
community property when he executed the 1990 Quitclaim Deed. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the decision of the District Court and remand with instructions to enter an order 
that Alva and Thelma held title to the Middleton Place as tenants in common, with their 
respective interests characterized as separate property. 
Second, the District Court's errors on the issue of delivery are almost a mirror image of 
the errors committed on the transmutation issue: The District Court applied the incorrect legal 
standard and, in so doing, relied on findings of fact that were legally and logically irrelevant to 
support the judgment. Applying the correct legal standard, the findings do not support a 
conclusion that Alva retained dominion or control over the 2006 Quitclaim Deed at the time he 
deposited it into escrow. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the District 
Court and remand with instructions to enter an order holding that Alva conveyed his interest in 
the Middleton Place to Jack. Because these two legal conclusions support the request for 
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partition prayed for in Jack's complaint, the District Court should be further instructed to enter 
an order for partition. 
A. The District Court erred when deciding the transmutation issue by applying 
the incorrect legal standard and by relying on legally and logically irrelevant 
facts. 
The District Court erred in two ways when examining the transmutation issue. First, it 
failed to anchor its analysis of transmutation of real property to any statutory formalities. And, 
second, because its analysis was not based on statutory formalities, it relied on legally and 
logically irrelevant evidence. 
1. Because "intent to transmute" is not anchored to any statutory 
authority it is the incorrect legal standard to apply to transmutation 
of real property. 
Jack and Thelma present two very different interpretations of the legal standard to be 
applied when analyzing transmutation of real property. Jack contends that this appeal presents 
the opportunity for this Court to clarify the interplay between Titles 32, 55, Idaho Code, and the 
parol evidence rule when dealing with transmutation of real property. Thelma contends that the 
recent case of Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799 (2010), stands for the proposition 
that no statutory formalities are required for the transmutation of real property and this appeal is 
nothing more than an attempt to overrule Barrett. 
It is well settled under Idaho law that parties may transmute real property only by 
complying with statutory formalities. Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 870, 873, 643 P.2d 82, 
85 (Ct. App. 1982). Consistent with this well-settled law, Jack has identified three potential 
statutory anchors that can be used to reconcile Barrett with Idaho's statutory formalities: Idaho 
Code § 32-917, Idaho Code § 55-508, and Idaho Code § 55-104. 
On this appeal, Thelma has effectively asked this Court to hold that no statutory 
formalities limit relevant parol evidence that may be considered and the only test for 
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transmutation of real property under Idaho law is whether the grantor had an "intent to 
transmute." Resp. Br. at 12-14. Thelma's characterization of this appeal is correct only if this 
Court intended that Barrett overrule thirty years of Idaho precedent prohibiting the informal 
transmutation of real property. 
Because there is no indication that Barrett was intended to create such sweeping changes 
to Idaho's real property and community property laws, because the statutory anchors Jack cited 
are consistent with Barrett, and because Thelma offered no legal authority, analysis, or argument 
in support of her request to over-turn well settled law, this Court should reject Thelma's over-
broad interpretation of Barrett and hold that parol evidence of transmutation of real property 
must be anchored in some statutory authority. 
a. Barrett neither expressly nor impliedly held that courts may 
ignore the statutory authority of Idaho Code § 55-508 when 
characterizing the interests created by a deed executed by and 
between spouses. 
Idaho Code § 55-508 unambiguously states: 
Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or more 
persons ... constitutes a tenancy in common, unless expressly 
declared in the grant or devise to be otherwise. 
I.e. § 55-508 (emphasis added). 
In Barrett, the deed read: "Ann Barrett and Gregory Barrett, Wife and Husband as 
Tenants by the Entireties." 149 Idaho at 22, 232 P.3d at 800. Unlike that deed, the 1990 
Quitclaim Deed contains no indication or reference to the fact that Alva and Thelma were 
married. Because the 1990 Quitclaim Deed does not contain an express declaration that Alva 
and Thelma hold the Middleton Place as anything other than tenants in common, in order to even 
consider whether title was held as community property, the District Court had to reject the plain 
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language of Section 55-508 and rely on extrinsic evidence of the parties' marriage. See App. Br. 
at 8. 
A rule of law that permits a trial court to rely on extrinsic evidence of marriage solely to 
avoid application of Idaho Code § 55-508 would judicially nullify the statute with respect to 
every conveyance by and between spouses. Because the deed in Barrett contained an express 
declaration that the parties held title as something other than tenants in common, Barrett does not 
require that courts ignore Idaho Code § 55-508 when characterizing property interests created by 
deeds executed by and between spouses. Accordingly, Jack's request that this Court rely on the 
statutory authority of Section 55-508 is not a request for this Court to overrule Barrett. Rather, 
his request is consistent with Idaho law requiring that the transmutation of real property follow 
statutory formalities. 
b. Barrett neither expressly or impliedly held that courts may 
ignore the statutory authority of Idaho Code § 55-104 when 
characterizing the interests created by a deed executed by and 
between spouses. 
Thelma argues that the "intent to transmute" standard articulated in Barrett should not be 
restrained by the "acquired as community property" standard of Idaho Code § 55-104, calling 
such limitation "overly simplistic, formulaic, and not in line with Idaho case law." Resp. Br. at 
13-15. In effect, Thelma argues that Barrett held parties may transmute real property without 
complying with any statutory formalities. Because Barrett did not expressly overturn 
longstanding authority and because Thelma has not offered any authority, argument, or analysis 
in support of this bold extension of Idaho law, Thelma's interpretation of Barrett should be 
rejected. Instead, Barrett should be given an interpretation and application that is consistent with 
Idaho statutory authority and Idaho case law. 
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Thelma's interpretation of Barrett is based on a concluding sentence which reads "the 
determination whether property has been transmuted is a question of fact turning on intent. In 
making this factual determination, trial courts are free to consider all relevant evidence 
regarding that intent." Barrett, 149 Idaho at 25, 232 P.3d at 803 (emphasis added). After 
stripping that statement of the historical context of Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 
(1983), Thelma argues that a court can consider any and all extrinsic evidence and ignore the 
requirement that transmutation of real property comply with statutory formalities. 
Conversely, in an effort to read Barrett within the context of the longstanding principal 
that transmutation of real property must comply with statutory formalities, Jack cited to Idaho 
Code § 55-104 as one of three potential statutory anchors. Jack argued that "relevant evidence" 
referenced in Barrett was evidence speaking to the "acquired as community property" standard 
of Idaho Code § 55-104. Jack then discussed how each of the six WinniBarrett factors worked 
within the timing and funding analysis mandated by Idaho Code §§ 32-903 and 32-906, thereby 
satisfYing the statutory formality of Section 55-104. 1 App. Br. at 9-14. 
Thelma offered no argument, analysis, or authority in support of her proposition that all 
evidence is relevant evidence regarding "intent to transmute," nor has she offered any argument, 
analysis, or authority to support her proposition that this Court should shed the requirement that 
transmutation of real property must comply with statutory formalities. A voiding any statutory 
restraint on the evidentiary inquiry authorized by the WinniBarrett line of cases would 
effectively overturn the long standing rule that transmutation of real property must comply with 
statutory formalities. Thus, Thelma's proposed application of Barrett is overbroad and should be 
I Jack recognizes that the six WinnlBarrett factors present an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of potentially relevant 
evidence. The critical proposition advanced by Jack is that the evidence considered must be relevant to the timing 
and funding analysis discussed in Kraly, 147 Idaho at 303, 208 P.3d at 285, and anchored in the statutory authority 
ofldaho Code §§ 32-903 and 32-906. 
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rejected. Accordingly, Jack respectfully requests that this Court hold that extrinsic evidence 
regarding intent to transmute (i.e., evidence speaking to the six WinniBarrett factors) is limited 
to the "acquired as community property" standard of Idaho Code § 55-104 and that the District 
Court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard. 
2. The District Court's decision must be reversed because its findings of 
fact are legally irrelevant when the correct legal standard is applied. 
In reaching its conclusion that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed transmuted Alva's separate 
property interest in the Middleton Place into community property, the District Court relied on 
several facts that are irrelevant as a matter of law. The District Court looked to any and all 
evidence of Alva's intent to transmute, instead of the "acquired as community property" standard 
ofIdaho Code § 55-104. 
As noted in Jack's opening brief, the District Court relied on at least five fmdings of fact 
that speak only of Alva's undisclosed, sUbjective intent regarding transmutation: (i) Alva had 
previously encumbered the Middleton Property (, 12.1);2 (ii) Alva had encountered financial 
difficulty (, 12.2); (iii) Alva and Thelma had previously alienated all other real property owned 
by either of them (, 12.3); (iv) Alva and Thelma had a contract for wills and mutually reciprocal 
wills (, 12.9); and (v) some alleged fear that John would talk Alva into alienating the property 
(, 10).3 App. Br. at 17-18. However, because the correct inquiry is restrained by the "acquired 
as community property" standard of Section 55-104, evidence of Alva's undisclosed, subjective 
intent to transmute is irrelevant as a matter of law. 
2 The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appear in the Record at Volume II, page 239-262. Each paragraph is 
separately numbered. Rather than identifYing each paragraph by its full citation to the record, as he did in his 
opening brief, Jack will identifY each paragraph as (~, when referring to specific fmdings and conclusions. 
3 Jack detailed these facts in his opening brief, showing why each did not apply to the correct legal standard. App. 
Sr. at 16-21. In response, Thelma argued only that these facts were uncontroverted. Resp. Sr. at 17-18. 
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The District Court also supported its conclusion with the finding that Alva and Thelma 
retired prior encumbrances with the proceeds of a loan secured by the 1990 mortgage (~ 12.7).4 
Thelma has not cited and Jack cannot locate any Idaho authority that stands for the proposition 
that using loan proceeds to retire separate property debt has any impact on the characterization of 
the asset securing the loan proceeds. Like the other five findings, this particular fact is simply 
legally irrelevant to the question of transmutation. 
3. The District Court's decision must be reversed because the findings 
that are relevant to the "acquired as community property" standard 
of Idaho Code § 55-104 do not logically support the conclusion that 
Alva transmuted his interest in the Middleton Place. 
In reaching its conclusion that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed transmuted Alva's separate 
property interest in the Middleton Place into community property, the District Court did rely on 
several facts that are legally relevant under the "acquired as community property" standard of 
Idaho Code § 55-104, which guides the WinniBarrett factors. However, because the District 
Court did not anchor its characterization of the Middleton Place to the correct legal standard, 
these particular findings were misapplied. When properly applied, these findings do not 
logically support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton Place as community 
property. Because this Court may exercise free review when applying the facts to the law, it is 
4 This portion of the finding in ~ 12.7 is not only legally irrelevant, it is also not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Jack detailed the evidence in the record, demonstrating that the two original mortgages created 
a total encumbrance of $44,000.00 and showing that the proceeds from the sale of 53 acres of the Middleton Place 
generated a $75,000.00 purchase price. App. Br. at 18. Jack then noted the absence of any portion of Thelma's 
accounting ledger indicating a remaining loan balance on these prior mortgages. App. Br. at 17-18. Thelma 
countered this evidence with citation to her testimony that the new mortgage was taken out to retire the earlier 
mortgages. Resp. Br. at 14-15 (citing Tr. p. 217, L. 19 - p. 222, L. 2). A review of Thelma's testimony, however, 
demonstrates that she testified that the $20,000.00 loan was retired with payments from the sale of the 53 acres 
(which were Alva's separate property). Tr. p. 220, L. 23 - p. 221, L. 7. While Thelma's testimony the point that the 
prior mortgages were retired using proceeds from the sale of the 53 acres was clear, her testimony as to what the 
proceeds from the $20,000 loan were used for is unclear and confused. Tr~ p. 221, L. 8 - p. 222, L. 20. 
Accordingly, no reasonable mind could conclude that any portion of the loan proceeds secured by the $20,000.00 
1990 mortgage was used to retire the pre-existing debts on the 53 acres. 
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within this Court's authority to freely determine the characterization of the Middleton Place 
based on the lower court's factual findings. 
First, the finding that Alva executed the 1990 Quitclaim Deed to effectuate obtaining a 
mortgage on the Middleton Place (~ 12.4) is relevant only in that it opens the door to the 
"acquired as community property" standard ofIdaho Code § 55-104 and consideration of the six 
WinniBarrett factors. That is to say, because the 1990 Quitclaim Deed may have been associated 
with a credit acquisition, a court may consider extrinsic evidence of whether Thelma acquired 
her interest as community property. 5 The credit acquisition does not help to establish the 
character of the property. Because this finding only opens the door to consideration of the 
WinniBarrett factors, it does not support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton 
Property as community property. 
The District Court also looked to the names on the deed to support its conclusion that 
Alva's interest in the Middleton Place was transmuted into community property. (~12.5). The 
District Court did not, however, correctly apply this factor to the "acquired as community 
property" standard of Section 55-104. The 1990 Quitclaim Deed does not expressly state that the 
grantees hold their interests as anything other than tenants in common: Accordingly, the 
statutory presumption of Idaho Code § 55-508 applies. Because the deed creates a presumption 
5 During the course of this matter, Thelma has taken manifestly inconsistent positions with respect to whether the 
1990 Quitclaim Deed was prepared in connection with a credit acquisition. Currently, for purposes of this appeal, 
Thelma argues that the deed was executed during the course of credit acquisition, thereby opening the door for this 
Court to consider parol evidence and, more specifically, the six WinniBarrett factors. Resp. Br. at 14-15. 
Conversely, at the summary judgment stage and at trial, Thelma rejected any claim that the preparation of the deed 
was done in conjunction with a credit acquisition, arguing that the lack of such connection is proof that the couple 
intended to transmute Alva's separate property interest into real property. Tr. p. 43, L. 22-p. 45, L. 17; p. 418, L. 3-
L. 7. 
Thelma's attempt to ascribe two mutually exclusive meanings to this finding demonstrates how little meaning this 
Court should give to this particular factor. Thelma cannot argue that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed was executed during 
the course of a refinancing, so parol evidence should be considered, and then argue that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed 
had nothing to do with refmancing efforts, so the Court should assume greater intent to transmute than that which is 
expressly reflected in the deed. Her argument is internally inconsistent and logically flawed. 
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that Alva and Thelma held their interest as tenants in common, this factor suggests only that 
additional evidence must be considered to characterize Thelma's tenant in common interest. 
The District Court also looked to the names on the mortgage to support its 
characterization of the Middleton Place as community property. (~12.5). However, under the 
facts of this particular case, the names on the mortgage shed no light on whether Thelma 
acquired her interest in the Middleton Place as community property. The 1990 mortgage 
includes the names "Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett, husband & wife." Def.'s Ex. KK. 
While the mortgage provides more information regarding the relationship of Alva and Thelma 
than does the 1990 Quitclaim Deed, the "husband & wife" reference does not indicate whether 
Thelma acquired her interest as community property or separate property, nor does it indicate 
how the bank may have characterized the Middleton Place. Without more, the "husband & wife" 
reference lends equal support to either characterization. Accordingly, this particular fact does 
not necessarily support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton Place as 
community property. 
The District Court also relied on its finding that Alva and Thelma co-mingled other 
personal property and separate income (~ 12.6) to support its characterization of the Middleton 
Place. This particular finding is both legally and logically irrelevant. It is well settled under 
Idaho law that parties cannot informally transmute an interest in real property through 
co-mingling of funds. See, e.g., Stockdale, 102 Idaho at 873, 643 P.2d at 85. It is, therefore, 
logically impossible that co-mingling of personal property assets constitutes relevant evidence of 
an informal intent to transmute real property. Accordingly, using the fact of co-mingling of 
personal property and separate income as circumstantial evidence that the parties intended to 
informally transmute their interest in real property would be improper. App. Br. at 18. Thelma 
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did not offer any argument or authority that countered this position, instead noting only that the 
evidence was not contradicted. Resp. Br. at 18. 
Finally, the District Court relied on the finding that Alva and Thelma used community 
funds to pay the indebtedness secured by the 1990 mortgage to support its characterization of the 
Middleton Place as community property. (~12.7). 6 However, under Idaho law, using 
community funds to pay the indebtedness secured by separate property collateral does not 
change the character of the underlying security. Rather, the reverse is true: Under well-settled 
Idaho law, the character of the debt follows the character of the security. Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 
Idaho 44, 55, 227 P.2d 278, 285 (1954). Further, "the character of an item of property as 
community or separate vests at the time of its acquisition." Winn, 105 Idaho at 814, 673 P.2d at 
414 (citing In re Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 555 P.2d 385 (1976)). 
[P]roperty cannot be converted gradually from community to 
separate [or vice versa] by one spouse making payments on a 
community debt from his or her separate funds. That would in 
effect allow one spouse to "buy" the community property and 
thereby unilaterally transmute its character. Such reasoning is 
violative of the fundamental of the transmutation doctrine: that the 
character of property may be changed by agreement between the 
spouses. 
Id. at 814, n. 2, 673 P.2d at 414, n. 2 (emphasis in original): Under this authority, the possible 
use of approximately $2,000 from an unidentified source7 to make payments on a note secured 
6 Not only does this fact not support the conclusion reached by the District Court, it is also not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Thelma was unable to testify as to any payments made out of community funds 
towards the indebtedness secured by the 1990 mortgage. App. Br. at 19-20. The entries on the accounting ledger 
that could, possibly, be linked to payments by Alva and/or Thelma towards the indebtedness secured by the 1990 
mortgage totaled only $2,028.25 in payments towards a $20,000.00 indebtedness. App. Br. at 20. Moreover, there 
was no evidence whether these payments were made from Alva's separate property income, Thelma's separate 
property income, or any income earned by the community. Because this finding is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, it must be disregarded. 
7 Thelma makes much of the fact that her social security payments were nearly double Alva's, as she argues that the 
District Court could have inferred that the bank looked to her income when making its lending decision. Resp. Br. 
at 16-17. A review of the findings indicates that the court did not make such an inference. Moreover, even if the 
bank had looked to Thelma's social security payments, those are her separate income: Social security payments are 
separate property. Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 277, n.l, 611 P.2d 1055,1062, n. 1 (1980). Thelma's accounting 
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by the Middleton Place does not support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton 
Place as community property. 
B. The District Court erred when deciding the delivery issue by applying the 
incorrect legal standard and by relying on legally and logically irrelevant 
facts. 
The District Court's errors on the delivery issue mirror the errors committed on the 
transmutation issues. To begin, instead of placing the burdens of proof and production on 
Thelma to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Alva retained dominion or control 
over the 2006 Quitclaim Deed when he delivered it into escrow, the District Court improperly 
placed these burdens on Jack to establish that Alva intended to divest himself of title. Because 
the District Court looked to the wrong party to prove the incorrect standard of law, its findings 
are legally and logically irrelevant and do not support a conclusion that delivery was invalid 
when the correct standard of law is applied. 
1. The District Court applied the wrong legal standard on the delivery 
issue because it required Jack to prove Alva's intent to divest himself 
of title rather than requiring Thelma to prove Alva retained dominion 
and control over the deed when he deposited it into escrow. 
As discussed in Jack's opening brief, based on the undisputed facts of this case, Jack's 
claim of title to the Middleton Place is supported by two legal presumptions: (i) he has title to the 
property based on the duly recorded 2006 Quitclaim Deed and (ii) the duly recorded deed was 
ledger clearly delineated which portion of the funds on deposit in the couple's joint accounts were her social security 
payments and which portion of such funds were Alva's social security payment. Def.'s Ex. BB. And, these two 
sources of separate income were not so inextricably intertwined that they were co-mingled. Under Idaho law, the 
commingling of separate personal property of one spouse with the separate property of the other spouse and/or with 
community property does not convert the separate personal property into community personal property unless "it is 
impossible to trace the source of the funds." Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 797, 430 P.2d 686,689 (1967), quoting 
Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116,264 P.2d 626, 631 (1953) (emphasis in original). "So long as the 
separate property of either spouse is identifiable and traceable, commingling of such separate property with 
community property does not convert the separate property into community property." Jd Indeed, to the extent that 
the lender might have relied on Thelma's social security income as a potential source of repayment, the lender 
would have been relying on a separate property asset, not a community property asset. The lender looking to 
Thelma's separate property income as a potential source of repayment does not support the characterization of the 
Middleton Place as community property. 
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delivered as of the date of the deed. In order to overcome these presumptions, Thelma was 
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over 
the deed when he delivered it to a third-party, thereby making delivery invalid. That is to say, 
Thelma was required to prove that at the time Alva gave the 2006 Quitclaim Deed to John, Alva 
reserved the right to have the deed returned to him, ifhe requested it. App. Br. at 23-24. 
In his opening brief, Jack detailed Idaho case law regarding the correct legal standard for 
proving that delivery was invalid: 
Delivery is effective if a deed is given to a third party with 
instructions to deliver to the grantee after the death of the grantor. 
Cell v. Drake, 61 Idaho 299, 303, 100 P.2d 949, 950 (1940) (citing 
Showalter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 160 P. 1042 (1916); Martin v. 
Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 32 P. 287 (1893)). It is well recognized 
that delivery to a third party with such instructions "constitutes a 
present passage of title with a reservation of a life estate in the 
grantor." Id To prove delivery to a third party was invalid, the 
party challenging delivery must show that at the time the deed 
was delivered into escrow, the grantor retained some dominion 
over the third party to request the return of the deed. Estate 
of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299, 302, 543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975) (noting that 
the "question of intent as of the time the deed was given [into 
escrow] is the controlling question). 
App. Br. at 25 (emphasis added). Thelma did not attempt to refute, rebut, or distinguish this well 
settled authority. Rather, Thelma misinterpreted this argument and authority, attempting to 
recharacterize the issue on appeal as one of circumstantial vs. direct evidence. See, generally, 
Resp. Br. at 19. That re-characterization misses the issues presented on this appeal. 
Jack's appeal cites error by the District Court in (i) placing the burden of proof on him 
and (ii) then applying the incorrect legal standard. Although the District Court found that Alva 
instructed John to record the deed after Alva's death, (~27), the court placed the burden on Jack 
to prove that Alva "completely divested himself of title" (~ 29). That is the incorrect legal 
standard. 
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The correct legal standard is to place the burden on Thelma to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed at the time he 
deposited it into escrow with John.8 See In re Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299,302,543 P.2d 852, 
855 (1975) (noting that the "question of intent as of the time the deed was given [into escrow]" is 
the controlling question). Accordingly, Jack respectfully requests that this Court apply the 
uncontroverted findings to the correct legal standard: whether Alva retained dominion or control 
over the deed. 
2. The District Court's decision must be reversed because all of the 
findings support a conclusion that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was 
validly delivered. 
In his opening brief, Jack argued that the findings were not inconsistent with the legal 
conclusion of valid delivery. App. Bf. at 24 - 27. In response, Thelma argued that all of these 
facts were uncontroverted and, further, that circumstantial evidence was competent evidence. 
Resp. Br. at 19-20. Jack agrees that circumstantial evidence is competent evidence and the facts 
were uncontroverted. However, even if evidence is circumstantial and uncontroverted, the 
findings must still be applied to the correct legal standard. Because the findings are consistent 
with the legal conclusion that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was validly delivered, they cannot-as a 
matter of law-also support the conclusion that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was not validly 
delivered. 
As noted in Jack's opening brief, at both summary judgment and trial, Thelma failed to 
present any evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed at the time he placed 
8 Thelma argues that it was not possible for her to obtain direct evidence of the escrow instructions given to John 
because she was unaware of the existence of the deed until after Alva's death. Resp. Br. at 19. Thelma's alleged 
lack of knowledge at the time Alva delivered the deed into escrow does not excuse Thelma from her evidentiary 
burdens. John submitted an affidavit at the summary judgment stage testifying that the only instruction he received 
from Alva was not to have the deed recorded until after Alva's death. R. Vol. II, p. 223, 1111. Thelma did not take 
John's deposition during discovery, nor did she call John as a witness at trial. Accordingly, the only evidence is that 
Alva did not give John any limiting instructions that would support the legal conclusion that Alva retained dominion 
or control over the 2006 Quitclaim Deed when he delivered it into escrow. 
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it into escrow. Because this is the correct legal standard for detennining whether delivery to a 
third party is valid, Cell v. Drake, 61 Idaho 299, 100 P.2d 949 (1940), the absence of evidence on 
the point is fatal to Thelma's claim. Tellingly, during closing argument, Thelma's counsel 
admitted that there was little to no evidence presented on the issue of delivery: "I don't know 
how much evidence [Thelma] actually presented to the court on the issue of delivery." Tr. p. 
436, L. 10-12. Because Thelma had the burden to prove ineffective delivery by clear and 
convincing evidence, her counsel's concession that she had not presented evidence on the issue 
of delivery is a very strong indication that she failed to meet her burden. 
Here, all of the findings support the legal conclusion that there was valid delivery of the 
2006 Quitclaim Deed during Alva's lifetime. It is undisputed and uncontroverted that Alva 
delivered the deed to John with instructions to have it recorded after Alva's death. (~27). Based 
on nearly identical facts, this Court concluded delivery was valid: 
[T]he positive instruction given to [the third party], to keep the 
deed in his safe until after [grantor's] death, and to deliver it to 
[grantee] after [grantor's] death, precludes any intention, either 
express or implied, that [grantor] reserved the right or privilege of 
recalling the deed at any time prior to her death; and of course she 
could not do so afterward. The instruction is plain and 
unambiguous. 
Under a well recognized line of authorities in this country, a deed 
to real property may be executed and placed in the hands of a 
depositary or escrow holder for delivery to the grantee after the 
death of the grantor, and constitutes a present passage of title 
with a reservation of a life estate in the grantor. 
Cell, 61 Idaho at 303, 100 P.2d at 950 (italics in original) (bold and underlining added). 
Applying the uncontroverted facts to this well settled authority: Alva's delivery of the 
2006 Quitclaim Deed to John constitutes valid delivery as a matter of law, unless there is 
sufficient evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed. See id The findings 
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that Jack was not aware of the deed initially, (~ 30.5), and never took physical possession of the 
deed, (~ 30.6), are not proof that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed. Therefore, 
these findings are irrelevant. 
Under Cell, Alva's instruction that John not record the deed until after Alva's death 
"precludes any intention, either express or implied, that [Alva] reserved the right or privilege of 
recalling the deed at any time prior to [Alva's] death." See Cell, 61 Idaho at 303, 100 P.2d at 
950. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Alva did not retain dominion or control over the deed. 
The findings that Alva did not want the deed recorded until after his death, (~ 30.1), and that 
John--consistent with these wishes and instructions--did not record the deed until after Alva's 
death, (~ 31), are not proof that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed. Rather, these 
findings show that John, as an escrow agent, followed the escrow instructions. Accordingly, 
these findings are entirely consistent with a conclusion of valid delivery. 
Under Cell, Alva's instruction that John not record the deed until after Alva's death also 
"constitutes a present passage of title [to Jack] with a reservation of a life estate in [Alva]." See 
Cell, 61 Idaho at 303, 100 P.2d at 950. This authority is found throughout Idaho law: "[I]t is not 
... inconsistent with the passage of a present title, particularly in a father-son relationship, that 
the incidents of management be retained by a grantor." Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 160,525 
P.2d 352, 355 (1974) (citation omitted); see also In re Estate a/Courtright, 99 Idaho 575, 577-
80, 586 P.2d 265, 267-70 (1978). Accordingly, the findings that Jack did not take possession of 
the property after Alva executed the quitclaim deed, (~ 30.2), Jack continued to pay rent, (~ 
30.3), Alva continued to accept rent, (~ 30.4), and Jack did not accept rent, (~30.8), do not prove 
that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed. Rather, these findings are entirely 
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consistent with the passage of present title to Jack with a reservation of a life estate by Alva. 
Thus, these findings are entirely consistent with a conclusion of valid delivery. 
In short, not a single finding proves that Alva retained dominion and control over the 
deed-the proposition that Thelma was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence in 
order to establish that delivery was invalid. Because the findings are consistent with present 
passage of title to Jack with a reservation of a life estate in Alva, this Court may rely on the 
findings to conclude as a matter of law that there was valid delivery during Alva's lifetime. 
IV. . CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Jack respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision 
of the District Court with instructions to enter an order holding that Alva and Thelma held their 
respective tenants in common interests in the Middleton Place as separate property and that Alva 
conveyed his separate property interest to his son, Jack. Jack further requests that this Court 
instruct the District Court to enter an order granting Jack's prayer for partition of the Middleton 
Place. 
DATED this ;()~ay of January, 2012 
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